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Productivity, Discrimination, and Lost Profits 
During Baseball’s Integration 
 
JONATHAN A. LANNING 
 
This article uses data from Major League Baseball’s integration to identify the 
sources and magnitude of labor market discrimination. Returns to hiring black 
workers in this industry were high, and the industry’s labor supply was uniquely 
suited for rapid integration, yet integration evolved slowly. Many explanations  
for this sluggishness are considered, including both taste-based and statistical 
discrimination. Ultimately, only owner and collective coworker discrimination 
can explain baseball’s slow pace of integration. The estimated levels of  
discrimination are high, showing the median team sacrificed profits of nearly $2.2 
million in 1950 dollars (over $19 million 2010 dollars) by delaying integration.  
 
ajor League Baseball’s 1947 integration was a pivotal event in 
America’s movement away from racial segregation. Though some 
large industries had integrated prior to baseball, these earlier integrations 
were generally inconspicuous.1 For example, the Ford Motor Company 
appeared to be well-integrated by the 1920’s, but due to high levels of 
internal segregation, few inside Ford (and even fewer outside of Detroit) 
could appreciate the diverse racial composition of Ford employees.2 A 
more public event was the establishment of the Fair Employment Practice 
Commission during World War II, yet the actual impacts and efficacy  
the integrations sparked were not transparent to the public.3 While these 
earlier integrations were no doubt important, the American workplace, and 
society at large, remained largely segregated in 1947. 
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 Three years prior to baseball’s integration, Gunnar Myrdal suggested  
a solution to this persistent segregation. In An American Dilemma, he 
concluded that that “more public events” were essential to overcoming 
“white indifference,” and in fact that “publicity is of the highest 
strategic importance” for racial equality.4 Unlike earlier integrations, 
Major League Baseball’s prominence made its integration a truly public 
event that could meet Myrdal’s charge. More than 18.5 million 
consumers attended Major League baseball games in 1947, with many 
millions more attending games in other leagues.5 Even outside of Major 
League cities, most every newspaper dedicated numerous daily column-
inches to baseball, and nearly every major news outlet covered 
baseball’s integration.6 Baseball’s integration also reached from sports 
into popular culture—for example, a song about Jackie Robinson (the 
man who integrated baseball in 1947) reached as high as #13 on 
national radio charts. In fact, prior to Brown v. The Board of Education 
of Topeka, baseball’s integration was an issue of “even greater salience” 
than school desegregation in the fight for Civil Rights.7 Through 
baseball, a nation would bear direct witness to the success or failure of 
an institution’s integration.  
 The importance of baseball’s integration may be best measured  
by the impact it had on future integration efforts. Baseball  
integrated in 1947, a year before President Truman integrated the armed  
forces, seven years before the Brown case, and 17 years before the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Baseball was also a catalyst for these subsequent 
“public” integrations.8 Long before efforts to integrate other public 
spaces could be considered, “dozens of minor league baseball  
teams, even in places like Montgomery [Alabama] and Durham [North 
Carolina], signed their first black players.”9 Even strongholds of 
segregation were accepting of baseball’s integration as an initial step 
toward integration; Birmingham, Alabama willingly repealed its ban on 
interracial sporting competitions in an attempt to get the Dodgers to 
visit during spring training in 1954.10 Baseball provided such a lasting 
 
 
4 Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 48. 
5 Lanctot, Negro League Baseball. 
6 Tygiel, Baseball’s Great Experiment. 
7 Klarman, Jim Crow, p. 186. 
8 For example, two of the more important Supreme Court cases leading up to Brown, Sweatt 
v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, were so inconsistent with previous rulings 
that they “are best explained in terms of social and political change; by 1950 major league 
baseball had been desegregated for three years, a salient and important development for several 
of the justices, who were huge fans” (Klarman, Jim Crow, p. 209). 
9 Ibid., p. 388. 
10 Ibid., p. 393. 
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icon of desegregation that decades later “the Jackie Robinson story was 
used repeatedly as a metaphor during integration of the southern textile 
industry.”11  
 Civil Rights leaders were also keenly aware of baseball’s  
importance, and Robinson’s contributions. In particular, Martin Luther 
King Jr. poignantly captured Robinson’s importance to the Civil  
Rights Movement, stating “back in the days when integration wasn’t 
fashionable, he underwent the trauma and the humiliation and the 
loneliness which comes with being a pilgrim walking the lonesome 
byways toward the high road of Freedom. He was a sit-inner before the 
sit-ins, a freedom rider before the Freedom Rides.”12 This national 
salience made baseball’s integration a “great experiment,” both socially 
and economically. As such, baseball’s integration served as something of 
an integration litmus test for the nation, one that garnered a great deal 
more public attention than most any prior industry’s integration.  
 In addition to its historical importance, the integration of Major 
League Baseball also provided excellent data that make it an ideal case 
study of the market discrimination at play in this era. The integration of 
the first Major League Baseball team was abrupt, public, and absent the 
governmental involvement that affected the integration patterns in many 
previous case studies of integration.13 This allows for a “clean” analysis 
of the market forces working for and against integration. The slow  
and public nature of baseball’s integration provides excellent data  
on both individual- and firm-level productivity. These data allow for 
unique analysis into the sources and magnitudes of the economic 
discrimination that affected baseball’s integration.  
 But despite its unique positioning, relatively little economic analysis 
has been performed on baseball’s integration.14 And while many papers 
document evidence of discrimination in sports, most have focused  
on customer discrimination, and none have attempted to disentangle  
the multiple potential sources or motivations behind discrimination.15  
 
11 Minchin, Hiring the Black Worker, p. 294. See Heckman and Payner, “Determining the 
Impact,” for an argument that the southern textile industry’s integration was of particular 
economic importance.  
12 King, “Hall of Famer.” 
13 For example, see Heckman and Payner, “Determining the Impact.” 
14 Notable exceptions are Gwartney and Haworth, “Employer Costs”; Hanssen, “Cost of 
Discrimination”; and Goff, McCormick, and Tollison, “Integration.” Each of these document 
evidence of some type of economic discrimination based on team performance—however none of 
these studies used any measure of individual-level productivity. 
15 Some papers have attempted to identify types of economic discrimination using data from 
markets indirectly connected to race, such as the market for memorabilia (e.g., Nardinelli and 
Simon, “Discrimination”; and Andersen and LaCroix, “Customer Racial Discrimination” ) or from 
nonmarket sources such as game shows (e.g., Levitt, “Testing Theories of Discrimination”; and 
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Since this article uses a rich data set that includes individual- and  
firm-level productivity measures from an actual market, I am better  
able to identify the sources of economic discrimination surrounding 
baseball’s integration. 
 Ultimately, I find that the median team sacrificed profits of nearly 
$2.2 million in 1950 dollars (more than $19 million in 2010 dollars)  
by remaining segregated. I then show that the incentives to integrate 
should have been clear by 1950, and identify the most likely reason  
for the delay of integration as owner hesitancy based on their own 
discrimination or collective discrimination by their players.  
 
A Brief History of Baseball’s Segregation and Integration 
 
 Major League baseball first integrated in 1884, when the integrated 
Toledo Blue Stockings joined the Major Leagues; but this period of 
integration was short-lived.16 After the 1884 season, white professional 
baseball adopted a “gentlemen’s agreement” discouraging any teams 
from hiring black players. The strength of this rule was bolstered  
by many prominent players claiming that they would refuse to play for  
or against “any team with colored players.”17 At this time the Major 
Leagues and the franchises they comprised were very much in flux, and 
the loss of a prominent star could well have caused irreparable damage 
to a team’s reputation and financial success.18 Whether this threat was  
a reason or an excuse for segregation, the “gentlemen’s agreement” 
effectively barred black players from the Major Leagues in 1884; by 
1898 every minor league had adopted a similar policy.19  
 In response to the “gentlemen’s agreement,” entrepreneurs began 
founding leagues composed of players excluded from the Major 
Leagues based on race. While many of these leagues were small  
and financially unviable, even at the outset they comprised a great  
deal of talent.20 The nature of the Negro Leagues changed in 1920  
when Andrew “Rube” Foster founded the Negro National League,  
and the “major” Negro Leagues were born.21 These leagues were  
 
Antonovics, Arcidiacono, and Walsh, “Games”). Other studies document discrimination in other 
sports; Kahn, “Discrimination in Professional Sports,” offers a thorough survey of this literature. 
16 Ribowski, History of the Negro Leagues. 
17 Ward and Burns, Baseball. 
18
 However, Cap Anson—the most vocal player in opposition to integration—played against 
integrated teams when faced with the choice of playing or forfeiting his game check. See Ward 
and Burns, Baseball. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ribowski, History of the Negro Leagues; and White, Colored Base Ball. 
21 Ribowski, History of the Negro Leagues. 
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well-organized, well-advertised, played in most Major League  
cities, and even in many Major League stadiums.22 They drew  
large crowds, were financially relevant, and displayed a product of 
comparable, and in some cases higher, quality than the all-white 
leagues. Given the attendance, publicity, and quality of the Negro 
Leagues, the owners or customers of white Major League franchises 
were likely well-aware of the talent available to a team willing to  
break the “gentlemen’s agreement.”  
 In October 1945 Robinson signed a minor league contract with  
the Brooklyn Dodgers. After integrating the minor leagues in 1946, 
Robinson took the field for Brooklyn on 15 April 1947 and became  
the first black man to play Major League baseball in 63 years. The  
on-field returns were immediate: Robinson won the Rookie of the Year 
Award and finished third in the league’s Most Valuable Player 
balloting. Robinson’s success was not unique: three of the first five 
former Negro League players to play in the white Major Leagues would 
eventually be elected to the Hall of Fame, and despite their sparse 
numbers and relative short time horizon, former Negro League players 
would be comprise one-sixth of Major League Baseball’s “All-Century 
Team.”23 
 Some franchises quickly followed the Dodger’s lead and integrated. 
Table 1 shows the years when each Major League franchise reached 
some key integration landmarks. But by 1950, long after the potential 
returns to integration should have been apparent, 12 of the 16 Major 
League teams had still failed to integrate. It would take until 1965 
before every team had employed at least one full-time black player. 
 
Data 
 
 The data used for this analysis include Major League team-level  
data on productivity, individual-level data on the Major League and 
“pre-market” productivity of all former Negro League players who 
participated in the Major Leagues, and similar individual-level data  
for all white players who made their Major League debuts between 
1950 and 1953. Individual-level data include an assortment of measures 
of Major League productivity, as well as pre-market indicators  
 
 
22 Lanctot, Negro League Baseball. 
23 Among the first five integrators, Jackie Robinson, Larry Doby, and Roy Campenella are 
members of the Major League Baseball Hall of Fame. The relevant members of the “All 
Century Team” are Hank Aaron, Ernie Banks, Bob Gibson, Willie Mays, and Jackie Robinson. 
Mays and Aaron were among the top five vote recipients. 
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TABLE 1 
YEARS OF INTEGRATION FOR MAJOR LEAGUE FRANCHISES 
Team 
Major League 
Integration 
Minor League 
Integration 
First Negro 
Leaguer in Major 
Leagues 
First Full-Time 
Player in Major 
Leagues 
Brooklyn Dodgers 1947 1945 1947 1947 
Cleveland Indians 1947 1947 1947 1948 
St. Louis Browns 1947 1947 1947 1956 
New York Giants 1949 1949 1949 1949 
Boston Braves 1950 1948 1950 1950 
Chicago White Sox 1951 1950 1951 1951 
Philadelphia Athletics 1953 1951 1954 1954 
Chicago Cubs 1953 1949 1953 1955 
Pittsburgh Pirates 1954 1951 1954 1954 
St. Louis Cardinals 1954 1953 1956 1958 
Cincinnati Reds 1954 1952 1954 1956 
Washington Senators 1954 1951 — 1955 
New York Yankees 1955 1949 1955 1959 
Philadelphia Phillies 1957 1952 1957 1960 
Detroit Tigers 1958 1953 1959 1961 
Boston Red Sox 1959 1949 1961 1965 
Notes: Teams are sorted in order of Major League integration.  
Sources: Major and Minor League Black Signings are from Lanctot, Negro League Baseball; 
First Negro Leaguer in Major Leagues is from Clark and Lester, Negro Leagues; and Black 
Full-Time Players are from Hanssen, “Cost of Discrimination.”  
 
potentially relevant for the prediction of this Major League productivity. 
The team-level data is a constructed panel of all 16 Major League  
teams over the 16 years inclusive of 1946–1961.24 These team-level 
data include measures of each team’s performance, attendance, and  
the demographic characteristics of their cities. Additional data on  
team finances were also collected from the 1951 and 1957 hearings 
conducted by the House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary 
Inquiry into Organized Professional Team Sports. These data include 
profits and losses for all Major League franchises from 1920–1950, as 
well as somewhat more detailed revenue and cost breakdowns for the 
years 1946, 1950, and 1952–1956.  
 As noted earlier, measures of an individual’s productivity are rare,  
but key to assessing economic discrimination. Since such measures 
have not been used in previous economic studies of baseball’s 
integration, they have not been able to identify the sources of economic 
 
24 Pre-1946 data are not used. As most of the regular professional players were away serving 
in World War II, earlier data offer little information on the postwar trends or quality of teams 
and leagues.  
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discrimination. In this analysis, Expected Runs Produced (ERP)  
per At Bat is used to measure a player’s productivity. ERP is a simple 
linear transformation of individual performance measures that yields the 
expected team runs resulting from a player’s efforts.25 ERP can also  
be aggregated to the team level and is highly accurate at predicting the 
total runs scored by a team in larger samples.26 More importantly, ERP 
is very effective at predicting the output for high-productivity players 
and teams. This property makes it ideal for this analysis as many of  
the former Negro League players and their teams were well above 
average in their production.27 A limitation of ERP is that it only reflects 
the contribution of batting with no evaluation of a player’s defense or 
pitching.28 As there were very few black pitchers given the opportunity 
to perform at the Major League level, this study focuses only on 
positional players. That the barriers facing black pitchers appear to  
have been higher than those faced by black positional players is an 
interesting topic in its own right, and could imply a form of “color line” 
discrimination not explored here.29  
 I measure a team’s integration in two ways: a simple binary  
variable indicating whether the team employed a former Negro League 
player, and the proportion of a team’s at bats that went to former  
Negro League players. The measures allow flexibility in identifying the 
response to hiring the first and subsequent Negro League players, while 
also measuring the extent to which the players contributed to the team.30 
 One concern with these data is the possibility that there might  
be systematic endogenous selection into integration. This presents a 
problem if the teams that integrated early were systematically “better” 
than those that resisted integration, an effect that might lead to inflated 
 
25 The specific calculation of ERP is ERP = .16 * (3 * singles + 5 * doubles + 7 * triples + 9 * 
homeruns + 2 * walks + stolen bases − .61 * outs made). 
26 Johnson, “Estimated Runs Produced.” 
27 Substituting other measures of productivity such as Runs Created, Wins Above Replacement 
Player, and On Base plus Slugging Percentage does not impact the relative size or statistical 
significance of the results. 
28 Former Negro League players were often asked to play new “lower value” positions, but 
did so very well according to most metrics (see James, Win Shares). As such, omitting defensive 
value may well reduce the estimated benefits of integration. 
29 Scully, “Discrimination,” offers some analysis of this issue, finding that attendance at 
games started by black pitchers was lower than games started by white pitchers. Andersen and 
LaCroix, “Customer Discrimination,” also show that there is greater customer discrimination 
against the baseball cards of black pitchers in this era. Sundstrom, “Color Line,” and Kahn, 
“Discrimination in Professional Sports,” offer more general discussions of discrimination that ?
is dependent on the “standing,” visibility, or characteristics of a job. 
30 Only black players who had played in the Negro Leagues are included in this analysis, as 
those players would have developed skills and training more relevant to a Major League team 
than those (very few) black players in this era that had not played in the Negro Leagues. See, for 
example, Dodson, “Integration of Negros.” 
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estimates of the returns to integration. Previous work has found  
little evidence that integration was a function of easily measured 
performance features of the teams.31 Table 2 shows the results of a 
similar analysis using the Cox Proportional Hazard model to examine 
the impact of lagged team productivity factors on the persistence of 
segregation. Only one productivity factor had a statistically significant 
influence on a team’s integration. When a team was in contention  
to win the league in the previous year, that team was statistically 
significantly less likely to integrate in two of the three specifications. 
This finding implies that the coefficients of a regression of productivity 
on integration will be biased in a negative direction, a bias that   
works against my findings that Negro League players increased the 
productivity of teams.  
 
Tests of Taste-Based Economic Models of Discrimination 
 
 To explore the impact of integration on a team’s productivity, I  
run regressions of ERP per At Bat and a team’s Wins on the integration 
measures and a set of controls. I also include team and year fixed effects 
to adjust for any team- or time-specific effects, such as home stadiums 
that facilitate scoring or league-wide scoring cycles. The inclusion of 
these fixed effects presents some econometric difficulty for estimating 
standard errors. To mitigate this problem, I employ a block bootstrap 
procedure to determine statistical significance. 32 
 The results from the productivity regressions show that Negro 
League players were a high-productivity option for teams in this  
era. Specification I in Table 3 shows the estimates of the impact of 
integration on a team’s ERP per At Bat. The coefficient on the dummy 
variable indicating whether a team is integrated is both small and 
statistically insignificant, while the coefficient on the proportion of 
a team’s at bats going to a former Negro League player is positive  
and statistically significant. This implies that there was little change to 
the productivity of a team’s players when a team simply added a former 
Negro League player to the roster and he got no at bats. However,  
the coefficient for the Share of At Bats given to former Negro League 
players shows that a team could have increased its productivity by 2.9  
 
  
 
31 Hanssen, “Cost of Discrimination.” 
32 See Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, “How Much Should We Trust,” for a discussion of 
the difficulty in estimating difference in difference specifications when the number of groups is 
small, and the efficacy and specifics of the block bootstrap procedure in addressing this issue. 
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TABLE 2 
COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACTS OF TEAM 
CHARACTERISTICS ON INTEGRATION, HAZARD RATIOS REPORTED 
(z-scores in parentheses) 
Independent Variables 
 1 Year  
of Lags 
 2 Years  
of Lags 
 3 Years  
of Lags 
Log of city population  1.0131  0.8748  0.0779 
  (0.02)  (–0.14)  (–1.05) 
Share of population that is black  0.0013  0.00009  3.3 x 10−12 
  (–0.96)  (–1.04)  (–1.29) 
Another team in city?  4.4838  24.545  298.866 
  (1.39)  (1.50)  (1.56) 
       
1-Year lagged ln(attend per game)
 
 1.7486  0.0512  0.0001 
  (0.42)  (–1.04)  (–1.15) 
1-Year lagged wins
 
 1.0188  1.0145  1.0669 
  (0.49)  (0.20)  (0.45) 
1-Year lagged contend
 
 0.1209*  0.0584*  0.0131 
  (–1.90)  (–1.68)  (–1.45) 
       
2-Year lagged ln(attend per game)
 
   144.19  4.3107 
    (1.45)  (1.52) 
2-Year lagged wins
 
   0.9383  0.9992 
    (–0.87)  (–0.01) 
2-Year lagged contend
 
   1.6232  0.0283 
       (0.31)  (–0.97) 
       
3-Year lagged ln(attend per game)      1.3025 
      (0.07) 
3-Year lagged wins      0.7784 
      (–1.36) 
3-Year lagged contend      0.8929 
      (–0.05) 
       
Log likelihood
 
 –22.906  –12.039  –8.266 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level or better. 
Notes: Results are for estimates of Cox Proportional Hazard models with a team’s integration  
is defined as the failure time, using the exact partial likelihood method for dealing with  
observations with identical failure times. Proportional hazard ratios are reported; therefore 
values less than one indicate that an increase in the independent variable decreases the “hazard” 
of integrating, and increases the expected duration of segregation, while values greater than one 
indicate an increase in the independent variable decreases the expected duration of segregation. 
Another team in city? is a dummy variable set to one if a team has a competing Major League 
franchise in their MSA, Contend is a dummy variable set to one if a team finished among the 
top four teams in their league as measured by wins.  
Source: See section “Data.” 
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TABLE 3 
REGRESSIONS OF TEAM AND PLAYER PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES FOR THE 
PERIOD 1947–1961  
(t-scores in parentheses) 
Independent Variables 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Team ERP  
per AB 
(mean = .1285) 
[I] 
Wins 
“Average” 
(mean = 77) 
[II] 
White Player 
ERP per AB 
(mean = .1265) 
[III] 
Intercept  .1355 151.5 .1353 
Integrated? .457 –.0002 –.0930 .004 
 (.499) (–0.08) (–0.07) (0.87) 
Share ABs to Neg. Leaguers .056 .0352** 22.65** –.039 
 (.086)   (2.66) (2.39) (–0.47) 
     
Additional controls  X X X 
Team fixed effects  X X X 
Year fixed effects  X Not applicable1 X 
     
R2  .5469 .7551 .6990 
Adjusted R2  .4801 .7356 .4068 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level or better. 
1Year fixed effects are not included in the Wins regression because league-wide wins do not 
vary across years. 
Notes: T-scores were evaluated using block bootstrapping to account for any cluster effects. For 
a more complete description of the block bootstrap procedure and properties in the specific 
context of limited clusters, see Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, “How Much Should We 
Trust.” Both Integrated and Share ABs to Neg. Leg Players are measures integration; the former 
is a dummy variable set to one if a former Negro League player is on the roster, and the latter 
relative opportunity afforded Negro League players. Expected Runs Produced (ERP) is a 
coworker-independent measure of player productivity as measured by the number of additional 
team runs the player generates over an average replacement player (see the section “Data”).  
At Bats (AB) are used as a normalizing unit to ensure teams’ productivity is comparable. 
Additional controls include Runs Allowed (per At Bat) and Runs -ERP (per At Bat). The ERP 
per At Bat regressions include controls to address home field and league-wide characteristics. 
The White Player ERP per AB regression is estimated using data up to and including the year of 
teams’ initial integrations. This allows for better identification of the reaction to integration, as 
opposed to a team’s ability to hire nondiscriminatory players after integration.  
Source: See section “Data.” 
 
percent at the mean ERP per at bat if it brought in a Negro League 
player and made him a full-time player with one-ninth of the teams  
at bats.33 This finding is consistent with the classic Becker prediction 
that formerly excluded workers were more productive than the workers  
they replaced, and that integration increased the average productivity  
of a firm’s workers. Specification II in Table 3 shows the results when  
 
33 Team ERP per AB would have gone down by –0.0002 from just adding the player with no 
at bats. The benefit from giving the player one-ninth of all at bats was (1/9)*0.0352, and the 
mean ERP per at bat was 0.1285. The percentage increase is [–0.0002 + (1/9)*0.0352]/0.1285. 
The calculations for Wins follow the same pattern. 
974  Lanning 
  
  
a team’s wins are used as an alternative measure of productivity. The 
relative size and significance of the integration terms’ coefficients in 
this regression are similar to those of the individual-level productivity 
regression. Integrating with a full-time former Negro League player 
would have increased that teams expected wins by 2.42, or 3.15 percent 
of the average team’s total productivity. This is further evidence that  
the increased individual-level productivity documented in specification 
I translated to greater success for the team as a whole. As these results 
indicate that a team’s overall productivity rose as more Negro League 
labor was utilized more, the challenge now is to understand why 
integration proceeded slowly despite these productivity returns.  
 
Considering Coworker Discrimination 
 
 Coworker discrimination is notoriously difficult to disentangle from 
other types of discrimination. In fact, if coworker discrimination was 
prevalent enough, organized workers could have effectively kept owners 
from integrating as they had done in numerous unions in the early 1900s.34 
If players were able to convince owners to resist integration, they could 
have translated their prejudice into owners’ actions (or inaction). This type 
of coworker discrimination would have affected the owners’ extensive 
integration decision. As such, only individual coworker discrimination can 
be effectively isolated from owner discrimination.  
 Traditional models of individual coworker discrimination describe a 
situation when workers of a particular type have distaste for working 
alongside workers of a different type. These models conclude  
that favored workers will demand (but not receive) a higher wage  
when working with members of the disfavored group. But because of 
Major League Baseball’s “reserve clause”—a policy that effectively 
indentured a player to his team in perpetuity, so long as the team offered 
him at least the league’s minimum salary—players had virtually no 
ability to command higher wages. Despite this, some owners expressed 
concern that players unable to affect their wages would instead change 
effort levels.35  
 If white players had strong discriminatory attitudes, the introduction 
of Negro League players who were taking jobs from whites might have 
led to team strife that could have resulted in lower productivity by  
the white players on integrated teams. Specification III in Table 3  
shows the results of a regression of the ERP per At Bat of White Players 
on measures of integration. Note that this regression is estimated using  
 
34 See, for example, Fishback, Soft Coal. 
35 Ward and Burns, Baseball. 
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data only through the years of each team’s initial integration  
to eliminate the impacts of any post-integration changes in team 
composition, and better isolate any response to the “shock” of 
integration. These results show the productivity of remaining white 
players was not substantially affected by the replacement of white 
players with former Negro League players. The coefficient of the 
presence of any Negro League players is positive, but not statistically 
significant. Although the coefficient on the proportion of a team’s at 
bats going to former Negro League players is negative, integrating  
a full-time former Negro League player reduced average White ERP 
per At Bat by only –0.26 percent. This “zero response” can be partially 
explained by the fact that former Negro League players were not 
typically brought in to replace the lowest-skilled players, but were  
more often employed to fill spots vacated by retirement, injury, trades,  
or to fulfill specific position needs. Also of note is that there is no 
evidence that teams engaged in more frequent trading around the time 
of integration in order to remove prejudiced players from their rosters.  
 While these results provide no evidence to support a hypothesis  
of individual-level economic discrimination by Major League players,  
they also provide no evidence against more collective coworker efforts 
to dissuade owners from integrating. This is probably not surprising,  
as any individual who could have been identified as reducing his effort 
or output in response to integration would risk immediate replacement. 
As such, any manifestation of coworker discrimination was likely a 
collective effort to stave off integration. 
 
Testing for Customer Discrimination 
 
 Customer discrimination is a particularly important concern in the 
context of the baseball industry because the consumer’s evaluation of 
baseball involves watching and rooting for the players on a team. Thus, 
racial antipathy toward a player likely reduced the interest in a team more 
than say the purchase of a product that was produced or sold to the 
consumer by a black worker.  
 The number of fans attending a team’s home games is the measure 
used to evaluate customer discrimination. There is a concern with this 
simple measure: there is a distinct possibility that the fans who attended 
games after integration are not entirely the same fans who attended 
before integration. This makes the identification of individual customer 
discrimination impossible and raises the possibility that post-integration 
customers had a different value for teams. However, net attendance will 
reveal if discriminatory fans who stopped attending games were 
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outnumbered by the new fans induced by integration. Unfortunately, 
there are no available data that will allow for contrasting the value of lost 
and gained fans (e.g., relative sales of bleacher tickets versus box seats), 
so the “blunt instrument” of total attendance will have to suffice. One 
could also be concerned that teams altered their pricing strategies in the 
year they integrated in order to induce more fans to attend, but there is no 
evidence this occurred. Between 1950 and 1961, the period for which data 
are available, teams raised average ticket prices an average of 3.50 times 
and by a total of $0.49. Meanwhile, teams that integrated raised prices an 
average of 3.58 times and by a total of $0.48.36 Additionally, five of the 
12 teams that integrated in these years actually increased their average 
ticket prices in the year they integrated, while none decreased their  
ticket prices. As such, ticket prices do not appear to have been negatively 
influenced by their integration. 
 Table 4 shows the results of three regressions of teams’ attendances  
on measures of integration and other variables. Specification I shows the 
results of a specification using only the two measures of integration and 
fixed effects for teams and years. The coefficient on the Integrated 
dummy variable is positive and statistically significant at better than  
the 10 percent level, while the coefficient on the Share of At Bats to  
Negro Leaguers is negative but statistically insignificant. The estimated 
coefficients show that a team that integrated by adding a former Negro 
League player who played full-time would have experienced an increase 
in per game attendance of 1,731 (the coefficient for Integrated, 1,746 + 
(1/9)*–136.5, the coefficient for Share of At Bats to Former Negro League 
Players). This represents an increase of 12.2 percent of the average  
team’s attendance. Specification II shows the estimates when covariates 
for team productivity, city characteristics, and competition are included in 
the regression. The estimates are quite similar to those presented in 
specification I. In this specification, the average attendance gain available 
through integration with a full-time former Negro Leaguer would have 
been 1,974 per game, or 13.9 percent of the average team’s attendance. 
 However, the effects of integration on attendance likely interacted with 
the characteristics of a team’s city, which led me to estimate the model 
including the interaction effects in specification III.37 The estimated 
 
 
36 House Committee on the Judiciary, Inquiry. 
37 Note that interaction terms for all city and productivity measures are not included. Including 
all interaction terms generated substantial multicollinearity problems. Specifically, all interaction 
terms’ coefficient estimates had high standard errors, but the F-test of a regression using only these 
terms had a p-value of less than .0001. This led me to drop those interaction terms with the most 
correlation to the other interaction terms and the highest variance inflation factors. As is common 
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TABLE 4  
REGRESSIONS OF PER GAME ATTENDANCE AND PROFIT, 1947–1961 
(t-scores in parentheses) 
Independent Variables 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Attendance 
“Average” 
(mean=14,175) 
[I] 
Attendance 
“Covariates” 
[II] 
Attendance 
“Interactions” 
[III] 
Team Profit a 
(mean=125.3) 
[IV] 
Integrated? b               .457    1,746   1,644     2,462**      224.4 
               (.499)    (1.85) (1.84)  (2.85) (1.51) 
Share ABs to Neg.  
Leaguers 
              .056     –136.5   2,976.8      –224      845.2 
              (.086)        (–0.02) (0.52) (0.05) (1.92) 
Integration*another  
team in city? 
              .225       1,231      –47.08 
               (.418)    (1.12)       (–0.37) 
Integrate*city pop.  1,330,135          –.0011**         –.000007 
 (2,372,490)          (–4.82)       (–0.31) 
Another team in city?                .519   –3,754**   –4,507**     –287.2**                (.501)         (–3.53)        (−4.46)        (–3.01) 
City population  2,339,790            –.0006**        –.1505 
 (2,439,711)         (–2.03)         (–1.15) 
Share of MSA  
population black 
               .086  –15,868** –13,866** 450,128 
               (.094)    (–2.74) (–3.04)     (0.40) 
ERP per At Bat                .129       2,338   –1,470 
                (.013)             (0.07)  (–0.47) 
Wins             77          222.7**        9.23** 
            (14)    (4.72)    (2.13) 
      
Additional controls   X X X 
Team fixed effects  X X X X 
Year fixed effects  X X X X 
      
R2          .5361       .5942       .7635          .6098 
Adjusted R2          .4701       .5302       .7187          .4955 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level or better (determined using block bootstrapping to account 
for any cluster effects on the standard errors—see Table 3 for details). 
Notes: All regressions contain fixed effects for Teams and Years to account for team differences  
in stadiums and initial fan base and league-wide year differences in attendance. Additional 
Controls are the same as in Table 3. A log specification was also estimated, with little qualitative 
difference in the results. The “Interactions” specification includes only those interactions listed. A 
specification using a full complement of interaction terms was also estimated with very similar 
results as those presented.  
Source: See section “Data.” 
 
effect of integration is complicated by the inclusion of the interaction 
terms. As a first cut, if a team was competing with another team in the 
same city and the city population was the league average of 2.3 million 
people, integrating with a full-time former Negro League player would 
have raised attendance by 7.7 percent. Table 5 provides team-by-team 
  
 
in the case of collinear regressors, estimates using the full complement of interactions are similar in 
magnitude to those presented in Table 5, but with substantially higher standard errors. 
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TABLE 5 
ESTIMATED ATTENDANCE AND PROFITS AVAILABLE TO TEAMS VIA 
INTEGRATION 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Team 
Per Game Team 
Attendance  
in 1946 
Estimated 
Proportion  
Change in 1947 
Attendance 
Available by 
Integrating 
Years 
Segregated 
After 1946 
Average 
Annual Profit 
Available by 
Integrating 
($1,000s) 
Brooklyn Dodgers 1,797 0.131 0 514 
      (0.066)  (259) 
Cleveland Indians 1,057 0.156 0 301 
      (0.077)  (148) 
St. Louis Browns    526 0.507 0 539 
      (0.222)  (237) 
New York Giants 1,220 –0.156 2         –541 
      (0.130)  (452) 
Boston Braves    970 0.279 3 559 
      (0.121)  (242) 
Chicago White Sox    983 0.050 4 48 
      (0.132)  (127) 
Philadelphia Athletics    622 0.277 6 387 
      (0.195)  (272) 
Chicago Cubs 1,343 0.037 6 47 
      (0.097)  (123) 
Cincinnati Reds    716 0.278 7 412 
      (0.113)  (167) 
Pittsburgh Pirates    750 0.245 7 409 
      (0.108)  (180) 
St. Louis Cardinals 1,062 0.251 7 572 
      (0.110)  (251) 
Washington Senators 1,027 0.176 7 308 
      (0.079)  (138) 
New York Yankees 2,266 –0.084 8         –548 
      (0.070)  (458) 
Philadelphia Phillies 1,045 0.164 10 334 
  (0.116)  (235) 
Detroit Tigers 1,723 0.060 11 154 
      (0.049)  (127) 
Boston Red Sox 1,417 0.191 12 563 
      (0.083)  (243) 
Mean (all teams) 1,158 0.160             5.6 254 
Mean (post-1947 delayers) 1,165 0.136             6.9 208 
Mean (post-1950 delayers) 1,178 0.150             7.7 244 
Notes: Attendance figures are in thousands of 1950 dollars. Estimated attendance increases  
are based on total effects from Table 4. Average annual profits available are calculated using 
estimated changes in attendance, the 1950–1961 average ticket prices, concession revenues of 
35 percent of ticket price (from Zimbalist, Baseball and Billions), and cost assumptions detailed 
in the section “Estimating Owners’ Forgone Profits.” This table is sorted by order of integration 
to show the lack of a consistent industry-wide evolution of integration based on profit 
incentives. The year 1950 is chosen as an additional comparison year as it is three years after the  
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TABLE 5 — continued 
success of Brooklyn’s integration, long enough that teams could reasonably have avoided  
much of the uncertainty surrounding integration. There is also evidence that the returns to be 
made from integration were not exhausted by 1950. Specifically, the Chicago White Sox, the 
first team to integrate after 1950, saw their average attendance increase from 9,890 in the year 
prior to their integration to 17,028 in their year of integration. 
Sources: See the discussion in sections “Data” and “Estimating Owners’ Forgone Profits.”  
 
estimates of the change in attendance that would have been anticipated 
had the team integrated in 1947. All of the teams except the New York 
Giants and the New York Yankees are predicted to have had positive 
attendance gains. Despite the prediction, the New York Giants were  
the fourth team to integrated. At the other extreme of the predictions,  
the longest holdout to integration (the Boston Red Sox) had one of  
the highest projected returns from integration. They also had one of the 
lowest levels of profits prior to integration, losing more than $95,000 in 
1946. In summary, the vast majority of teams’ attendance predictions are 
positive and substantial. This finding is in sharp contrast to a hypothesis 
of customer discrimination.  
 There is one additional measure that might have signaled customer 
discrimination to owners of all white teams—the attendance at home 
games when an opposing team was integrated. To briefly assess this 
possibility, I explore the attendance reactions of the Detroit Tigers  
and Boston Red Sox, the last two teams to integrate, to the integrations  
of the Philadelphia Athletics, Washington Senators, and New York 
Yankees, the three teams that integrated just prior to their integration.  
In the year prior to their integrations, attendance at games against  
the three soon-to-be-integrated teams was 95.1 percent of the average  
home attendance for Detroit and Boston. In the year after integration, 
attendance at these games was nearly identical, at 95.3 percent of the 
average home attendance. While hardly evidence of the apparently high 
latent demand for integrated baseball that existed, these numbers do 
nothing to support the idea that fan response to integrated opponents 
provided a signal of customer discrimination to Detroit’s and Boston’s 
owners. 
 
Estimating Owners’ Foregone Profits 
 
 Owner discrimination models are among the most commonly 
presumed discrimination models, yet they are perhaps the most difficult 
to evaluate due to the absence of direct, quantifiable evidence of owner 
utility and/or distaste. But it should be obvious that if the returns  
from integration outweigh the owner’s distaste, that owner would choose 
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to integrate. Accordingly, in place of a direct analysis of individual owner 
preferences, I offer a revealed preference analysis based on estimates  
of the forgone profits that could have been achieved had an owner 
integrated earlier. As these estimates are of the actual profits forgone  
by an owner (not the maximum profits owners might have chosen to 
sacrifice), they serve as a lower bound on the level of owner distaste for 
integration.38 
 The estimated annual profits available to each team from integration 
are detailed in Table 5. These estimates are obtained by estimating  
both the revenues and cost a team would have realized by integrating. 
The revenue estimates are simply the estimated attendance gains  
from integration multiplied by the average ticket price and concession 
income per customer. The ticket price used is the average price for each 
franchise over the period 1950–1961, and the concession income is set 
to 35 percent of ticket revenues.39  
 Estimates of the costs associated with integration rely on a number  
of available data, including outlays to scout and sign Negro League 
players and relative salary effects of these players compared to white 
players. These costs are borne solely by the team that integrates, and  
not subject to any strategic or external considerations. Two additional  
costs, lost stadium rental revenue and decreased relative advantage in 
signing prejudiced white players, are shared by all teams when any team 
integrates. Many Major League teams earned revenues from renting 
their stadium to local Negro League franchises. As each Major League 
team’s decision to integrate had an impact on the likelihood of survival 
of the Negro Leagues, it would have reduced every team’s expected 
stadium rental revenue to teams in those leagues. Similarly, the more 
teams that integrated, the lower the expectations young white players 
would have had that any organization would remain all white or that 
they could avoid playing against black players. As such, each team is 
assumed to only have controlled one-sixteenth of both of these costs, as 
each of the 16 teams in the league is capable of impacting them.  
 The costs assumed include per player costs of $10,000 for the 
scouting and signing of each player, additional costs of $15,000 in  
lost scouting advantage, and $30,000 in lost stadium rental revenue 
realized once, when a team initially integrated.40 As former Negro 
League players were typically paid less than the players they replaced, 
 
38 Other potential goals of owners (e.g., team performance, attendance) all appear to be 
positively correlated with integration. As such, the financial considerations are a lower bound to 
the total returns from integration as well. 
39 Zimbalist, Baseball and Billions. 
40 The cost assumptions rely heavily on the data provided by the House of Representatives 
Committee on the Judiciary, Inquiry, and figures reported in Dodson, “Integration.” 
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an average payroll decrease of $9,494 relative to the league average  
is assumed. This is the average salary change by the eight teams  
that reported data on player salaries at the time of their integration 
during the 1957 Congressional Hearings. This change in payroll should 
include both the salary savings of hiring a low-cost player, and any 
increases to compensate discriminating players. However, to ensure 
these estimates are conservative, an additional cost of 10 percent of the 
average white player salaries on integrated teams is assumed. It should 
be noted that there is no evidence of such a response in salaries, 
however integrated teams did pay more in bonuses than did all  
white teams due largely to improved team performance. Further, there  
is no way to isolate any increase in monitoring, for example, higher 
managerial salaries to compensate for team chemistry or increased 
security costs, from the reported “general operational costs.”  
 Multiplying the annual profits available through integration by  
the number of years a team remained segregated shows the median  
Major League team gave up nearly $2.2 million in 1950 dollars  
(more than $19 million in 2010 dollars) during the period that they 
remained segregated. Although the blocked nature of these data make 
the precise level of statistical significance for these results difficult  
to establish, most of the estimates have relatively high t-scores. The 
average t-score is 1.71. As such, these estimates imply that most teams 
could have both yielded high expected profits from integration, and 
been fairly confident that integration would indeed be profitable. 
 These results are robust to the possibility that some teams may  
have been risk averse and adopted a “wait and see” attitude towards 
integration. When only those teams that remained segregated beyond 
1950—when the returns to integration should have been obvious— 
are considered, the median team’s lost profits are still more than  
$1.2 million in 1950 dollars (over $11 million in 2010 dollars).  
These results are also robust to the possibility of discontinuous returns  
and assumptions about the owners’ foresight. When early integrators  
are dropped from the analysis to account for the possibility they may  
have reaped disproportionately high returns, the relevant coefficients  
on integration in Tables 3 and 4 remain statistically significant at the 5 
percent level, although the profit estimates based on these coefficients 
drop by about 15 percent. When the analysis is repeated using data 
restricted to only information available in 1950—making the implicit 
and strong assumption that owners had no more foresight into the 
operations of their teams than the econometrician would have—the 
estimated returns to integration are actually higher (although the 
standard errors of these estimates are also higher).  
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 As an additional check on the relative magnitudes of the profit 
estimates, Table 4 also includes the results from a regression of  
team profits. Unfortunately, data on profits are limited in availability 
and subject to more idiosyncratic variability than are the attendance 
data. Specifically, measures of profits are only available for the years 
1946–1950, and 1952–1955, and are highly volatile due to fluctuations 
costs that are independent of integration, such as stadium renovations  
or losses incurred by the farm systems.41 
 Despite these limitations, the profit regression shows general support  
of both the direction and magnitude of the estimates in Table 5.  
The coefficients on both of the non-interacted integration measures  
are positive and large. If a team was competing with another team  
in the same city and the city population was the league average of  
2.3 million people, integrating with a full-time former Negro League 
player would have raised profits by attendance by $254.8 thousand. 
This estimated total effect is similar in magnitude to the average annual 
profits predicted in Table 5. Some care must be taken in drawing 
conclusions from this estimate, however; only the coefficient on the 
share of at bats for Negro Leaguers is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level, and the t-score for prediction is around 1.40.  
 Finally, it should not be overlooked that these financial returns are  
in addition to the increased wins and the potential for championships 
their teams might have achieved through integration. In short, not only 
did owners leave a great deal of profit on the table, but they did so by 
willingly providing a lower quality product to their customers. 
 
Testing for Statistical Discrimination 
 
 While it might seem odd to apply a model of statistical discrimination 
to an industry where output and pre-market signals are easily observed, 
it is important to note that these models only require that the signals 
sent by different groups correlate differently with the productivity, not 
that those signals are difficult to observe. These models take the general 
form 
 
                                                                (1) 
 
41 A better measure of the impact of integration is the change in a team’s revenues. 
Unfortunately, the availability of revenue data is even more limited, and only available for six 
teams. For those teams, the average increase in revenues between the two years prior to 
integration and the two years after was $381,450 per year, quite similar to the average revenue 
increase of $319,000 underlying the calculations in Table 5. 
E | si
j
j
si
j
s j
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where E[πi] is worker i’s expected productivity, j is the standard 
deviation of a signal from a j-type workers,  is the noise associated 
with a worker’s signal, si is the productivity signal sent by worker i, and 
sj is the average productivity of a j-type worker.42 In this context of 
negligible wage competition, the expected productivity should impact 
employment opportunities more than compensation. In other words:  
the higher a player’s expected productivity relative to his competition, 
the greater the likelihood that player will be given an opportunity to 
perform at the Major League level (in all likelihood at a typical rookie’s 
salary, regardless of race). As Negro Leaguers had both higher average 
productivity and lower wages than their white counterparts, it follows 
that the signal strength for these players would have had to be much 
lower than that of white players in order for statistical discrimination to 
slow the speed of baseball’s integration.  
 To estimate the predictive strength of pre-market signals on Major 
League productivity, I run the following regression separately for white 
and former Negro League players 
 
MajorLeagueERP = Xβ +                   (2) 
 
where MajorLeagueERP is the measure of productivity, X represents a  
set of measured pre-market indicators, and  is a stochastic error term.  
In these regressions, it is the R
2 
and not the predicted βs that serves as  
the appropriate measure of signal strength. As R
2 
measure the portion of 
the variance in ERP explained by the regressors, it serves as a viable 
proxy for the  term in equation 1.43 Thus, a lower R
2 
for Negro 
League players would be indicative of the lower signal strength required 
for a statistical discrimination explanation of baseball’s slow integration.  
 Table 6 shows the results of different specifications of the signaling 
regression expressed in equation 2. I run separate regressions on only 
Negro League data, only minor league data, and combined Negro and 
minor league data using two sets of pre-market indicators: “traditional”  
  
 
42 See Aigner and Cain, “Statistical Discrimination,” and Altonji and Blank “Race and 
Gender,” for further discussion of statistical discrimination models of this type. See Altonji and 
Blank, “Race and Gender”; Levitt “Testing Theories of Discrimination”; and Antonovics, 
Arcidiacono, and Walsh, “Games,” for examples of tests for statistical discrimination.  
43 Specifically, R2 can be written as the ratio of explained to total variation, or:  
,
the comparability of this term to 
the signal weight term in equation 1 is straightforward. 
j
j
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TABLE 6 
RELATIVE SIGNAL STRENGTHS OF PRE-MARKET PRODUCTIVITY INDICATORS 
FOR MAJOR LEAGUE EXPECTED RUNS PRODUCED, AS MEASURED BY R
2
 
 
Negro League 
Indicators  
Minor League 
Indicators  
Major League 
Indicators 
Player Group Traditional Modern  Traditional Modern  Traditional Modern 
Comparison of White and Black Player Signals 
White players    0.3763 0.3769  0.3763 0.3769 
Black players 0.1388 0.1630  0.4728 0.5993  0.6003 0.6883 
Evolution of Negro League Player Signal Strength 
Pre-1951 0.1363 0.1812  0.7748 0.8650  0.7224 0.8668 
Pre-1955 0.2160 0.2185  0.5162 0.6637  0.6797 0.7725 
Pre-1959 0.1283 0.1753  0.4620 0.5980  0.6052 0.7106 
All data 0.1388 0.1630  0.4728 0.5993  0.6003 0.6883 
Notes: Dependent Variable = Major League ERP, Output = R
2
. Data used are for white  
players who made their Major League debut between 1950 and 1953, and all former Negro 
League position players who played in the Major Leagues. “Traditional” indicators include 
those commonly known to casual fans, including Hits, Runs, Runs Batted In, and Home Runs, 
each adjusted to be per At Bat. “Modern” indicators include Slugging Average (the average 
number of bases a player attains per at bat) and a Pseudo ERP measure. Pseudo ERP is identical 
to ERP calculated without walks, as data on walks are unavailable for all players in the sample. 
However, as the correlation between Major League ERP per AB and Pseudo ERP per AB are 
very high (ρ = .8873), Pseudo ERP should be an effective proxy for ERP at the minor and 
Negro League levels.  
Source: See section “Data.” 
 
measures of a player’s minor league performance that even a casual  
fan could have been aware of (hits, runs, home runs, and runs batted in 
per at bat rates), and “modern” indicators encompassing the traditional 
measures as well as the minor league slugging average (total bases per  
at bat) and PseudoERP per at bat (see Table 6 for a description of 
PseudoERP). To account for the possibility that teams had to “learn” how 
to accurately predict the performance of Negro League players, I also 
present results of regressions using cumulative data from progressing  
4-year intervals.  
 In each comparable specification, the R
2 
for former Negro League 
players was actually higher than that of their white counterparts, opposite 
the result predicted by statistical discrimination. There is also no evidence 
of a “learning curve” in predicting the performance of former Negro 
League players. In fact, the R
2 
for former Negro League players is higher 
when the analysis is restricted to early integrators. This is less surprising 
than it might first appear. As early integrators were able to select from  
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the entire distribution of Negro League players, they could choose not  
just the best players, but also those who were most likely to succeed. 
Regardless, these findings are in such sharp contrast to the hypothesis  
of statistical discrimination they may imply that alternative forms  
of discrimination were stronger. By promoting a white minor leaguer  
in place of a former Negro Leaguer, owners actually decreased  
their expected payoffs and exposed themselves to increased risk. As  
such, the alternative forms of discrimination needed to exceed both the 
productivity advantage and the informational advantage former Negro 
League players possessed.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 This article examines the sources and magnitude of economic 
discrimination that slowed the integration of Major League Baseball. 
Customer, individual-level coworker, and statistical discrimination do not 
appear to have impacted this market. Only owner hesitancy can explain 
the delay of integration in Major League Baseball; however, this hesitancy 
might not be the sole result of owner discrimination. If discriminating 
players convinced owners they were all (or at least predominantly)  
unwilling to play on an integrated team, then the resulting segregation 
would be indistinguishable from owner discrimination. Just as important 
as the source of the discrimination is its cost; the median team sacrificed 
an estimated $2.2 million in 1950 dollars (more than $19 million in 2010 
dollars) to delay integration. But, the incentives to integrate were too large 
for discrimination to win out forever, and each team eventually integrated 
(despite few changes in ownership). 
 The finding that owners or collectives of players may have  
been responsible for the economic discrimination that manifested in  
this market is probably not surprising to those familiar with this era  
and industry. What is perhaps more surprising is the finding that 
individual coworker, customer, and statistical discrimination did not 
appear to significantly impact this market. This could be the result of 
the industry’s structure. Because labor and consumers in the industry 
had little market power, the impact their individual prejudices could 
have been limited.  
 These findings have implications well beyond the baseball industry. 
Baseball’s integration was a historically significant event, and may  
yield insight into the more general labor market discrimination at play in  
this era. Though the baseball industry was a relatively small industry,  
its integration was a nationally salient event that influenced the integration 
of many other industries and institutions. Additionally, since baseball  
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was a noncompetitive industry, the discrimination documented here could 
yield insight into the average level of discriminatory preferences in the 
larger market.44 Finally, baseball’s visibility also meant owners could hide 
neither their discriminatory hiring nor the negative impact it had on the 
quality of their product from their consumers.  
 
44 Becker, Economics of Discrimination, p. 47. 
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